Colloquium: Kyle Banick

Kyle Banick (Cal State Long Beach)
‘Phenomenology as a logic of reflection‘
Wednesday November 12th   •  5:00pm–7:00pm  •  LIBR–507

Abstract: This talk presents the central framework of my book in progress, which asks a simple but difficult question: How can reflection describe experience without losing touch with it? I argue that Husserl’s phenomenology can be understood as a logic of reflection—a method for introducing ideal concepts that remain grounded in the world as we live and experience it. The project links two problems that mirror this tension. Firstly, what holds the directedness of consciousness toward its object together across change, error, and abstraction? Secondly, under what conditions can reflection add ideal elements like meanings, senses, and logical forms without distorting what they describe? I propose that such reflective extensions must remain conservative with respect to the natural attitude, our ordinary way of engaging the world. A simple case from perception illustrates how phenomenology provides explicit criteria for when reflective concepts cohere with experience and when they do not. I close by showing how this framework bridges the long-standing divide between Fregean (meaning-centered) and experiential (world-directed) readings of Husserl and clarifies how a logic of reflection can define the scope of phenomenological method while connecting it to broader philosophical and scientific inquiry.