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Philosophy Day Symposium FA24
December 6 @ 12:00 pm - 5:30 pm
Before the sun sets on the calendar year, please join us for some solidarity and endterm socializing at our biannual Philosophy Day! symposium, which will be held on Friday December 6th from 12:00pm–5:30pm in room LA4–120 LA4–105. If you would like to attend the dinner afterwards, please RSVP in advance with co-organizer Nellie Wieland.
Program:
12:00pm: Opening Remarks
12:00pm–1:00pm: Faculty Speaker
Torsten Odland (UC Los Angeles)
‘Counting many as one: the ontological insignificance of grammatical number’
‘Counting many as one: the ontological insignificance of grammatical number’
- Abstract: Are there objects that are both one F and many Gs? (Say, one pile and many grains of sand?) The suggestion that there are—call it the One·Many Thesis—has been endorsed by many philosophers from Plato to Frege. However, on standard developments of Plural Logic, the One·Many Thesis appears to be logically false, since its natural formalization contradicts the axioms governing the logical constant inclusion (‘is among’). Moreover, treatments of counting in natural language semantics typically analyze ‘n Fs’ as applying to sets with cardinality n, all the members of which are F, which implies that nothing can both be in the extension of ‘n Fs’ and ‘m Gs’ if n ≠ m, since no set has two cardinalities. I respond to these objections and argue that the One·Many Thesis should not rejected on purely logical or semantic grounds. I develop a semantics for numeral noun constructions according to which counting is always relative to a principle of individuation supplied by the content of a noun. According to such a semantics, distinctions of grammatical number need not reflect any distinction in what is represented, and the One·Many Thesis can be true.
1:00pm–1:15pm: Short Break / Spillover Q&A
1:15pm–2:00pm: Graduate Student Research Presentation
Abel Peña (Cal State Long Beach)
‘Being self-ish: personal identity in branching cases‘
‘Being self-ish: personal identity in branching cases‘
- Abstract: Utilizing a teletransporter thought experiment, Parfit (1984) argued that psychological continuity (Relation R) is what matters when considering personal identity across time. He imagined a branchline case in which one person enters a science-fiction-style machine but two apparently identical persons emerge—one on Earth and one on Mars. Intuitively, the resulting people are at least qualitatively identical; but the scenario raises intriguing questions about whether they are also numerically identical. I shall argue that the lesson of the thought experiment is that branching cases produce numerically identical persons. After rehearsing thought experiments involving split-brain, mind-uploading, and neural-regeneration scenarios that support the plausibility of numerical identity in branching cases, I will put forward a novel argument that examines the experiences of personal identity from the perspective of post-branching persons. What this argument shows is that post-branching epistemically privileged persons tend to believe in numerical identity with other post-branching persons sharing the same ‘trunk’. Further, if post-branching epistemically deprived persons could avail themselves of the kind of verification immediately accessible to their epistemically privileged counterparts, then they, too, would be strongly inclined to recognize numerical identity with post-branching persons sharing the same trunk—despite scenarios of simultaneous continued existence.
2:00pm–2:15pm: Short Break / Spillover Q&A
2:15pm–3:00pm: Graduate Student Research Presentation
Omar Hussein (Cal State Long Beach)
”If I were a carpenter’: Chang and the problem of counterfactuals’
”If I were a carpenter’: Chang and the problem of counterfactuals’
- Abstract: In his recent book Realism for Realistic People (2022), Chang proposes a novel pragmatist philosophy of science that offers new definitions of ‘truth’ and ‘reality’. He suggests that the claims made by scientific theories should be regarded as true, and the entities posited by these theories regarded as real, to the extent that these claims or entities, respectively, contribute to well-designed scientific activities—those that are designed for success. As Chang acknowledges, such pragmatist approaches face challenges related to inaccessible or unobservable phenomena, as exemplified by Russell’s ‘young universe’ case and modern takes on it. Chang responds to such challenges by invoking counterfactuals. However, I argue that the invocation of counterfactuals raises further problems for Chang’s proposal; not only is it saddled with unwelcome metaphysical commitments, but it is unclear what qualify as ‘permissible’ counterfactuals on his account.
3:00pm–3:15pm: Short Break
3:15pm–4:00pm: Graduate Student Research Presentation
Travis Barnett (Cal State Long Beach)
‘All the luster and the light: Malebranche on the problem of moral evil and the image of god’
- Abstract: Philosophers of religion distinguish two types of evil. Whereas natural evil concerns the suffering and disorder caused by natural phenomena, moral evil is caused by free agents. Both types appear to threaten God’s perfection. So, those who maintain this distinction must account for each type in their theodicies, even if that requires offering distinct solutions. In Malebranche’s theodicy, his solution to the problem of natural evil has garnered significantly more attention than his treatment of moral evil. Even when scholars have addressed the latter type, they have either misunderstood key elements or talked around them. One such element is Malebranche’s assertion that God could have accomplished his purpose in creation without permitting moral evil, potentially breathing new life into the very problem he is attempting to solve. Another is Malebranche’s use of the image of God metaphor—the notion that humans bear a special resemblance to a creator—that he inextricably linked to human existence and moral evil. I address both of these issues in interpreting Malebranche’s theodicy. My primary aims are to show how his theodicy of moral evil vindicates God’s perfection and to demonstrate that the image of God metaphor plays a crucial role in that theodicy. What emerges is a version of the ‘greater-goods defense’ known as the felix culpa (‘fortunate Fall’ or ‘happy sin’), which maintains that the moral evil brought into the world through the Biblical Fall of humanity is permitted to engender some higher-order good.
4:00pm–4:15pm: Break / Socializing
4:15pm–5:30pm: Keynote Speaker
Sara Protasi (University of Puget Sound)
‘The value of sleeping’
‘The value of sleeping’
- Abstract: Should you take a pill that gives you all the health benefits of sleep and allows you to stay awake? I argue that you shouldn’t. I propose three reasons why sleeping, conceived of as a socially and culturally embedded human activity, is valuable. First, there is aesthetic value in the rituals that typically precede sleeping; second, there is interpersonal value in the intimacy that stems from sleeping with other people; third, there is ethical value in mere presence and in retreating from consciousness. In order to fully support my argument, I situate it within a conception of goodness that embraces the fragility of the human condition and the limitations stemming from our corporeal nature. I conclude with some practical implications of my view.
6:00pm–8:00pm: Reception and Dinner
Speakers and participants invited! [If you would like to attend the dinner afterwards, please let co-organizer Nellie Wieland know aforehand so that she has an accurate headcount.]
Come join us—let’s celebrate our department together.