SPA Student Speaker Series: Frank Mendoza, Liz Sato

The Student Philosophy Association is hosting a FA25 Student Speaker Series (SSS) event this Thursday October 23rd. The event will take place in LA2–101B at 4:00pm, and the topic will be Philosophy of Religion.

If you considering whether or not to take PHIL330 this coming SP26, this event may be interesting to you. Come check out these talks to get a better sense of this area.

Program:

• Abstract: In his Discourse on the Method, Descartes develops his famous argument for the ‘beast- machine doctrine’, which denies all forms of thought or consciousness—including reason, sense perception, and memory—to animals. Descartes appealed to the fact that animals do not use language or what he called ‘real speech’ to argue that the best explanation for the absence of real speech in animals is just that they are mere machines. Malebranche, a theologian and follower of Descartes, also endorsed the beast-machine doctrine but instead appeals to an Augustinian principle, viz., under a just God no innocent creature suffers. For Malebranche, we are forced either to accept that animals possess immaterial and immortal souls, or else endorse the beast machine doctrine. Leibniz challenged the beast-machine doctrine, taking special aim at Malebranche’s argument from divine justice. Leibniz’s strategy distinguishes between pain and misery: God would be unjust if he allowed animals to experience misery, but not if he allowed them to experience mere pain. Leibniz believed that God reserves immortality, the ability to reason, and personal identity for human minds, and only they can reflect on themselves as the subject of experience and experience misery. However, an inability to reflect, reason, enjoy immortality, or have personal identity does not imply that animals are incapable of experiencing pain entirely. Prima Facie, Leibniz’s distinction between pain and misery appears to be ad hoc, as he did not provide any grounds for this distinction when presenting it in his Theodicy. This talk will defend the cogency of Leibniz’s arguments in the Theodicy against Malebranche, arguing that there is nothing ad hoc about the distinction between pain and misery, which originated with Augustine rather than Leibniz. Leibniz’s affinities with Augustine are well-documented, and he likely took himself to be using Augustine’s distinction between pain and misery not only as a way in which to understand morality and divine justice, but as a way in which to correct Malebranche’s appeal to Augustine in the argument from divine justice. Additionally, a distinction between pain and misery is consistent with the development of Leibniz’s thought in his mid-late writings. Early modern defenders of the beast-machine doctrine who endorsed Cartesian dualism presupposed that dualism is the correct metaphysics of mind, presenting us with a false dichotomy: either animals are fully conscious or mere machines. However, other accounts are available, such as Leibniz’s own metaphysics, which allows for a hierarchy of perceiving beings, some of which experience pain without an ability to reflect on their pain.