MA Thesis Defense: Ryan Lam

‘Moral objections to moral realism‘
Ryan Lam (Cal State Long Beach)
08 June 2022  •  10:00am–12:00pm  •  Zoom link

Abstract: Moral realism is the view that at least one entity instantiates at least one moral property. In recent years, writers including Melis Erdur, Max Hayward, and Matthew Bedke have proposed separate but related objections to realism on moral grounds. My thesis aims to show how realism might not be threatened by any such objections. I offer two reasons for thinking so. Firstly, moral objections to realism may not apply to hybrid-style realisms. Secondly, moral objections to realism may be self-undermining. I then offer a speculative discussion of how moral objections to realism can benefit our understanding of what really morally matters.

Oral defenses are open to the public. For a draft copy of the thesis in advance, please contact Ryan <ryan.lam01@student.csulb.edu> directly.